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Facts saturate history. Historians of sport know only too well that English cricketer
William Gilbert Grace scored 54,211 first-class runs, that American Gertrude Ederle
swam the English Channel in 14 hours 30 minutes on 6 August 1926 and that
Englishman Roger Bannister ran the first sub-four-minute mile on 6 May 1954. Facts
are the truths that historians recover from what Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and
Margaret Jacob (1994, p. 259) call “the detritus of past living”. However, the great
paradox of historical facts is that they are typically trivial and banal and rarely
contribute to understanding the past. Reducing the life of one of England’s best-
known Victorians to a set of factual cricket scores, for example, leaves an absurdly
shallow picture of Grace as the founding father of modern cricket, a notorious
shamateur and wily entrepreneur. Moreover, whatever factual content historians
take from these three descriptions of Grace will depend upon their willingness to
accept a metaphor (‘father’) and complex concepts (‘modern’, ‘shamateur’,
‘entrepreneur’) reinforced by ideologically-loaded adjectives (‘notorious’ and ‘wily’).
It is hardly surprising then that philosophers of history point to the slender
relationship between the raw facts of the past and understanding the past. The latter
is an act of interpreting fragments from the past and not infrequently these support
several points of view (Berkhofer, 1995). Of course, notions of history as an
interpretive practice rather than a craft of recovering facts raises the question
addressed here: how do historians interpret historical materials, those remnants of
past human activity?
This question has particular significance at a time when historians are
increasingly thinking about historical materials and evidence in radically new ways
that are fundamentally changing the nature of history as an academic discipline. In
the light of these changes, the first part of the article sketches three different sets of
epistemological assumptions that operate in contemporary history; the second
applies these assumptions to a more detailed analysis of four pieces of historical
material. Reflecting on the analysis in part two, the conclusion discusses the complex
relations between the present and the past.
THREE MODELS OF HISTORY
In Deconstructing History, Alun Munslow (1997) identifies three basic models of
historical inquiry: reconstructionism, constructionism, and deconstructionism. Table
1 schematically represents the objectives and epistemological assumptions of each
model. As the Table illustrates, different objectives drive each model.
Reconstructionists set out to discover the past as it actually was (box 1),
constuctionists are more interested in interpretive generalisations and broad trends
(box 2) and deconstructionists delve into selected aspects of a past (box 3).
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Table 1. Models of History
Reconstructionism Constructionism Deconstructionism
Objective • Discovers the (unique)
past as it actually was
1.
• Interprets how,
why, patterns and
trends
2.
• Discovers a
(fragmented and
partial) past
3.
• Evidence-based
• Impose limits on interpretations
• Acknowledge that distance ensures detachment
4.
• Privilege empiricism
• Accept historical evidence as proof that the
past can be recovered
• View the past as fixed
• See the past as yielding knowledge about the
development of the present
• Regard the present as an unproblematic
platform from which historians look back into
the past
• Assume that traditional forms of
representation are transparent & preserve the
objectivity of observation
5.
• Begins analysis with
linguistic /
discursive
characterisation of
the historical
account
• Holds the past as a
slave to the present
6.
Epistemology
• Craft-like discipline
based on
interrogation of
sources
• Facts precede
interpretation
• Limits on
interpretation
imposed by
institutional &
professional
conventions
• Iterative activity
                                       7.
• Theoretical
discipline
• a priori knowledge
precedes facts
• Limits on
interpretation
imposed by theory
                                     8.
• Craft-like discipline
based on
contextualisation of
historical
knowledge
• Historical
knowledge always
relative
• Limits on
interpretation
imposed by
epistemology
9.
Principal sources: Berkhofer (1995), Gottschalk (1969), Hamilton et al. (2002),
Munslow (1997)
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Reconstructionists and constructionists share common epistemological assumptions
(box 5). Both privilege empirical methods, both accept historical evidence as proof
that they can recover the past, and both insist that their presentations are transparent
and objective. Nonetheless, different epistemological assumptions also divide
reconstructionists and constructionists (boxes 7 & 8). The key difference between the
two models is the extent to which they engage a priori knowledge, particularly
concepts and theories.
Reconstructionists oppose theory in the belief that it predetermines
explanations and that it tailors evidence. Among conservative reconstructionists, real
historical phenomena are unique configurations and one-off events; history consists
of the “stories … of individual lives, or happenings, all seemingly unrepeatable”
(Postan, 1971, p. 62). Constructionists deem theory integral to historical research.
They maintain that historians who desire to be more than antiquarians must be
trained in theory. Constructionists concede that historians require an intimate and
technical knowledge of their sources but they relegate these skills to the margins
(Sombart, 1929).
Constructionists hold theory fundamental to history for three reasons. First, the
range and volume of evidence bearing on many historical problems is so large that
historians cannot avoid selection, and theories provide frameworks for selecting
evidence. Second, theory brings to the fore relationships between human experiences
and thus enriches history. Third, identifying historical patterns invariably involves
some form of abstract thinking and connections to theoretical explanations and
interpretations. Responding to charges that theory predetermines history,
constructionists counter with the claim that theory enhances understanding and that
no one can “approach their evidence innocent of all presupposition” (Munslow,
1997, p. 40).
Deconstructionism finds a small, but nonetheless steadily growing, expression
in history. As per boxes 6 and 9, deconstructionists are highly sceptical of the claims
to truth made by objective empirical history. They view history as artificial
narratives, devoid of moral or intellectual certainty (Munslow, 1997).
How these epistemological assumptions play out in practice is the subject of
the remainder of this article. It examines how each model deals with different forms
of historical materials that constitute the basis of all historical interpretation.
Dealing with Evidence
All historians interpret historical materials and they typically present their
interpretations as validated evidence. Nonetheless, wide disparities exist in the way
historians approach historical materials. Table 2 provides a schematic representation
of both the general approaches and disparities between different models.
Box 1 shows that reconstructionists, constructionists and deconstructionists
agree that validated historical materials, or sources, are the building blocks of
historical knowledge, that historians must understand the origins and context of
each source and that historians must be able to explain how the source is relevant to
the historical question at hand (Marwick, 2001). That, however, is the extent of
agreement. Reconstructionists treat historical materials as concrete artifacts which
under interrogation will reveal the truth (box 2). Constructionists frame the
gathering and interrogation of historical materials within theory which they believe
is the primary means by which historians reveal reality (box 3). Deconstructionists
conceptualise historical materials as traces and examine them for their subjective,
partial, fragmented and open-ended contents (box 4). The remainder of this section
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applies these assumptions to four types of historical material: official documents,
oral testimony, films and photographs.1
Table 2. General Epistemological Assumptions of Historical Materials
Reconstructionism Constructionism Deconstructionism
• Validated sources are the building blocks of historical knowledge
• Practitioners must understand the origins and context of each source
• Practitioners must explain how the source is relevant to the question at hand
1.
• Historical materials are
concrete artifacts
• Interrogation reveals
truths
2.
• Theory drives
gathering and
interrogation of
historical material
• Theory reveals reality
3.
• Historical materials are
traces
• Traces are examined for
their subjective, partial,
fragmented and open-
ended contents
• Employs new theories –
semiology,
psychoanalysis,
structuralism – to assist
interpretation
4.
Official Documents
The term official refers to the records of states, governments, corporations, and
formally constituted organisations. Their records include legislation and by-laws,
internal memoranda, correspondence sent to other organisations and individuals,
statements of policy, reports and minutes of meetings. Evidence from official
documents is widely used in all branches of history.
Table 3 sets out the epistemological assumptions of the three models as they
apply to the analysis of official documents and archives, the principal sites housing
official documents. Reconstructionists regard official documents as especially
reliable material (box 1) and, subject to basic tests of verification and corroboration,
they intuitively assume a direct correspondence between official documents and the
past (e.g., Holt, 1989; Huggins, 2000; O’Hara, 1988; Struna, 1996). Likewise,
constructionists have little difficulty accepting official documents as reliable
historical materials although theories frame their gathering and the precise means of
interrogation (box 2) (e.g., Maguire, 1995).
Deconstructionists are less concerned about the reliability and accuracy of
official documents. They seek to understand their authority to define social problems
(which in sport include the abuse, discrimination and marginalisation of women,
gambling, violence and so forth). To this end, deconstructionists ask questions about
the way representations of particular problems serve specific political interests; they
are especially interested in the way certain voices are silenced and excluded
(Ashforth, 1990; Philips, 1992; White, 2000).
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These differences are most pronounced in the respective ways that
reconstructionists and deconstructionists approach archives. Reconstructionists see
archives as sites of knowledge; deconstructionists conceive them as sites of power.
Table 3. Epistemological Assumptions of Official Documents (and Archives)
Epistemological Assumptions
Historical
Material
Reconstructionism Constructionism Deconstructionism
Official
Documents
• Official documents
yield knowledge
about the past
1.
• Official documents
contextualised
within theory to
reveal reality
2.
• Official documents
serve political
interests
      3.
Archives • Archives: sites for
the retrieval of
knowledge
4.
• Archives: non-
theorised
5.
• Archives: sites for
the production of
knowledge
6.
Reconstructionists studying sport have made extensive use of archives. Ron Smith
(2001), for example, scoured some 50 university archives in researching his history of
radio and television in college sport, and Tony Mangan (1981) visited the archives of
leading English public schools for his history of the cult of athleticism in the
Victorian and Edwardian eras. Archives are indeed indispensable repositories of
primary materials and evidence for historians but they are not simple ‘stores of
transparent sources’ from which practitioners freely “recover total images”
(Ballantyne, 2003, p. 102).2 Historians of sport know only too well that governments
and associations manipulate, conceal, hide and destroy information (e.g., Watterson,
2002). In the former East Germany, the Ministry for State Security classified all
documents pertaining to the state’s controlled hormonal doping of athletes program.
Only select people could access the documents that included doctoral theses,
scientific reports from research institutes and sports associations, and protocol books
that gave the times and dosages of androgenic-anabolic steroids administered to
more than 10,000 athletes over nearly four decades. When the East German regime
collapsed in 1989, sports officials destroyed many compromising documents and
other sensitive materials ‘disappeared’ from official libraries (Franke & Berendonk,
1997).
Yet, such examples have not dented reconstructionist confidence in the archive
which remains a “beacon of light, a place…of and for sight”, a site where the
initiated cry out “once I was blind, but now I see” (Harris, 2002a, p. 75). Sports
historians Robert Barney (1995), Ron Smith (2002) and Stephen Wenn (1995) actively
promote this view. Reconstructionists privilege stories about the discovery of
documents and evidence over those that relate to their disappearance and
concealment. Werner Franke and Brigitte Berendonk (1997) describe their retrieval of
files containing tens of thousands of pages documenting the German Democratic
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Republic’s secret hormonal doping program, recounting instances of documents
surviving official purges and of Manfred Höppner, the deputy director and chief
physician of East Germany’s Sports Medical Service and doping system, selling
incriminating documents to the weekly magazine Stern (see also Ungerleider, 2001).3
Such narratives engender a firm belief among reconstructionists that persistence
leads to the truth. But this belief typically comes at the expense of ignoring the
circumstances under which archives are assembled and materials excised and
excluded.
It is precisely these issues that prompt deconstructionist scepticism in the
archive. “We often forget”, writes Achille Mbembe (2002, pp. 19-20),
that not all documents are destined to be archives. In any given cultural
system, only some documents fulfil the criteria of ‘archivability’. Archives
are the product of a process which converts a certain number of
documents into items judged to be worthy of preserving and keeping in a
public place, where they can be consulted according to well-established
procedures and regulations. The archive…is fundamentally a matter of
discrimination and selection, which, in the end, results in the granting of a
privileged status to certain written documents, and the refusal of that
same status to others. (See also Burton, 2003)
Among deconstructionists, then, archives are “processes of preservation and
exclusion” and places where states, corporations and organisations produce
knowledge for their own interests as distinct from sites for the retrieval of
knowledge (Hamilton, Harris & Reid, 2002, p. 9; Ballantyne, 2003; Harris, 2002b;
Stoler, 2002).4
Deconstructionists, it needs stressing, do not advocate abandoning archival
searches and they agree that questions about the trustworthiness, authenticity and
reliability of documents remain pressing. But they urge a more cautious engagement
with archived materials. As well as alerting historians to the ways in which archival
documents change over time, the “turn to the social and political conditions that
produced those documents has altered the sense of what trust and reliability might
signal and politically entail” (Stoler, 2002, p. 85; Hamilton, Harris & Reid, 2002).5
Much deconstructionist analysis of archives is couched in terms of social
memory and imagination. Verne Harris (2002a) defines the archive as a trilectic of
remembering, forgetting and imagining. Just as ‘every act of memory is also an act of
forgetting’ (Derrida, 2002, p. 54), so imagining “dances between remembering and
forgetting” (Harris, 2002a, p. 75). The deconstructionist tenet that ‘there is no
remembering that cannot become forgetting’, calls into question the saliency of the
documents recovered by Franke and Berendonk (1997; Ungerleider, 2001) pertaining
to East Germany’s secret hormonal doping program. It is highly improbable that
these documents will constitute an archival foundation for drug-free sport – a
memory reminding future generations of the athletes such as George Sievers and
Ralph Reichenbach who died from hormonal doping and a warning to aspiring
sportspeople of the severe side-effects that include liver tumours, liver cancer,
disrupted menstrual cycles, enlarged genitalia in young females and genitalia
atrophy in boys, “irregular heart rhythms” and “hazardous imbalances of serum-
cholesterol levels” (Ungerleider, 2001, p. 46). The signs of forgetting are everywhere.
The International Olympic Committee, for example, studiously avoids advertising
former president Juan Antonio Samaranch’s close friendship with Manfred Ewald.
As the secretary of state for sport in East Germany, Ewald was the ultimate
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mastermind of the doping programme; at the same time as suspicions raged about
East Germany’s sporting miracles, Samaranch awarded Ewald an Olympic Order
(Ungerleider, 2001).
Oral Testimony
The recording and analysis of oral accounts of the past is an invaluable and
compelling research method. Jennifer Hargreaves’ (2001, p. 1) interviews with
marginalised women who struggled against “particularly harsh forms of
discrimination” to partake in sport reveal the unique abilities of oral histories to
question informants and evoke recollections and understandings of individuals and
groups largely hidden from documentary sources. But reconstructionists initially
opposed attempts to extract evidence from oral communication because they said it
distorted and corrupted accounts of the past. Among the litany of problems they
identified were the “orientations, biases and manipulations” of interviewees and
interviewers and the peculiar relationships between them, lack of “clear
chronological organization”, “accretions over time [and] selective adaptations” and
the “vagaries and deficiencies of memory” (Hamilton, 2002, p. 212; Burton, 2003;
Vansina, 1985; White, 2000). Jules Tygiel (cited in Pope, 1996, pp. 69-70) identifies one
such example of manipulation in Ken Burns’s monumental documentary Baseball:
Buck O’Neil, Negro League veteran and former manager of the Kansas
City Monarchs,…described an incident which took place when [Jackie]
Robinson played for that team. The Negro League club pulled its bus into
a Southern gas station, where they hoped to fill the tanks and purchase
food. When the station owner refused to serve the individual players,
Robinson allegedly announced that they would purchase their gas
elsewhere, whereafter the owner, fearful of losing a sale, capitulated. ‘We’
learned a valuable lesson from Robinson, O’Neal indicated.6
According to Tygiel,
the gas station incident is a wonderful tale, repeated in many variations
by former Monarchs to demonstrate Robinson’s fiery temperament, his
refusal to accept discrimination, and his awareness of the chinks in Jim
Crow’s armor. O’Neil’s testimony assumes the authority of an
eyewitness. Yet, O’Neil was in the Army in 1945 and he never played
with or managed Robinson on the Monarchs. (cited in Pope, 1996, p. 70)
Despite these problems oral testimony gradually gained more acceptance among
reconstructionists, especially among those working with illiterate groups for whom
oral communication offers one of their few access points to the past.
Reconstructionists thus set out to make oral methodology as “rigorous and
equal to any documentary historiography” (White, 2000, p. 39). Early guidebooks
peppered oral practitioners with commonsense advice: prepare, adopt ‘a neutral and
objective presence’, listen carefully, refrain from interrupting, allow for pauses and
silences, ask open-ended questions, avoid jargon, probing and leading questions,
minimise the presence of the tape recorder (see box 1, Table 4).
But the formalisation of commonsense advice quickly encountered problems.
How, precisely, does an interviewer balance the need for a neutral presence with
the recommendation that they establish good rapport with interviewees? Or, how
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do interviewers reconcile open-ended questioning with opposing advice to control
the “focus and flow of the interview?” (Thomson, 1998, pp. 581-2; De Hart, 1993;
Thompson, 2000; Vansina, 1985). Nonetheless, reconstructionists convinced
themselves that they had worked through these issues and declared their ability to
unlock even the dimmest memory and to verify their facts (e.g., Haigh, 2001).
Table 4. Epistemological Assumptions of Oral Testimony (and Memory)
Epistemological Assumptions
Historical
Material
Reconstructionism Constructionism Deconstructionism
Oral
Testimony
• Oral evidence
produced through
structured
interviews
• Detachment from
subjects essential
1.
• Oral testimony
contextualised
within theory to
reveal reality
2.
• Oral evidence
produced in
negotiated dialogue
• Involvement with
informants a virtue
3.
Memory
• Memory variously
an  obstacle to, or a
databank of, the past
• Memory and
forgetting: distinct
conditions
• Truth and falsity:
absolute values
4.
• Memory
contextualised
within theory to
reveal
reality
5.
• Memory a creative
construction
produced in
dialogue
• Memory and
forgetting: one and
the same
• Truth and falsity:
obsolete concepts
6.
While reconconstructionists seek to extract objective truths from oral sources,
deconstructionists locate oral testimonies in “particular cultural practices” that have
their own ‘social, psychological, and cultural biases, perceptions and codes’ (De
Hart, 1993, p. 590 & p. 592). Deconstructionists are especially sensitive to the
communication patterns, practices and contexts of those particular subcultures. And,
whereas reconstructionists advise detachment between interviewers and
interviewees, deconstructionists consider some degree of subjective involvement in
the lives of informants a virtue (see box 3). It is especially helpful, says Jane De Hart
(1993), in shaping the questions asked.
It is in the area of memory that the different tenets pertaining to oral testimony
become most apparent in reconstructionism and deconstructionism (see boxes 4 & 6).
Reconstructionists promote the idea that interviewees simply retrieve their
memories in response to the right questions posed in the right circumstances.
Deconstructionists refer to dialogues between interviewers and interviewees that
involve considerably “more than the retrieval of memory” (De Hart, 1993, p. 590).
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Among deconstructionists, memory is not a simple act of retrieving facts and
information, it is a process of ‘creative construction’ that incorporates passion,
humanity and trope (De Hart, 1993; Murphy, 1986, p. 165; Thomson, 1998).
Deconstructionists do not necessarily dismiss memory because of its apparent
unreliability. Irrespective of whether Buck O’Neil was with Jackie Robinson during
the incident at the Southern gas station in 1945, his account informs us of how
African-Americans understand their collective situation. O’Neil’s story points to the
refusal of African-Americans to accept discrimination and their awareness of the
pragmatic limitations of white power. Thus, among deconstructionists, the apparent
reliability of memory is less important than “how people make sense of their past,
how they connect individual experience and its social context, how the past becomes
part of the present, and how people use it to interpret their lives and the world
around them” (Thomson, 1998, p. 586).
These issues figure prominently in Phil Vasili’s (1998) biography of Arthur
Wharton. In addition to being the first black professional soccer player in England,
Wharton, whose football career spanned from 1885-1902, also held the first world
record for the 100 yards from 1886-1923. But Wharton’s name is omitted from key
football texts of his era (e.g., the 1900 and 1901 editions of Football Who’s Who, Football
and How to Play, published in 1904, the Book of Football published in 1906) and
subsequent histories (e.g., Maurice Golesworthy’s Encyclopaedia of Association Football
published in 1973). This leads Vasili to ask why the British public erased Wharton
from its memory. Vasili answers this question by comparing the social contexts of
Wharton’s achievements with the African-American runner Jesse Owens who won
four gold medals at the 1936 olympics in Berlin and who remains fixed in the
American memory. (Associated Press named Owens its Athlete of the Half-Century
in 1950 and in 1976 he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom.)
According to Vasili, social memory has a political context and, just as olympic
officials prefer to forget Samaranch’s support for Ewald, so it was easier for the
public in imperial Britain to forget the athletic achievements of an African whose
sporting records contradicted prevailing ideas about white superiority and black
inferiority. Owens’ olympic successes, in contradistinction, “flowed with the
prevailing current of international politics” (1998, p. 194). An economic and imperial
power, Germany threatened the leading capitalist nations who sought to capitalise
on what they recognised as Nazi vulnerability to “practical refutations” of its racist
ideology (1998, p. 194). Owens’ achievements on the track “publicly denied the
nostrums of Nazism”, embarrassed the Germans and “provided immense
propaganda material to the opponents of fascism” (1998, p. 194). As Vasili concludes,
Owens’ medals “symbolise[d] not so much a victory for ethnic equality — for this
could have dangerous repercussions in house and yard — but rather a defeat for a
particular variety of racialism as constructed, implemented and propagandised by
the Nazis” (1998, p. 195).
Vasili highlights the deconstructionist preference for understanding the broad
context from which stories emerge rather than trying to establish the truth of every
single story. Deconstructionists accept that informants will say ‘different things at
different times’. In one interview in 1962, Helen Liston described her heavyweight
boxer son Charles (‘Sonny’) as a “good, obedient boy” who as a child “never gave
me any trouble”; in another interview the following year she referred to Sonny as
having been “a rough boy” who liked the “rough side of life” (Tosches, 2000, pp. 27-
28). These different accounts are not necessarily due to confusion on Liston’s part or
a faulty memory but more likely emanate from her own complex and disrupted life
and experiences. As Luise White explains, “people do not give testimony that fits
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neatly into chronological or cosmological accounts.…they talk about different things
in personal terms; they talk about what happened to them and about what they did
about it, but they also use themselves as a context in which to talk about other things
as well” (2000, p. 39). The reconstructionist idea that a person “would not change
[their] mind or words, serves historians not the speaker’s own complicated interests”
(2000, p. 40). In the case of the latter these will undoubtedly include taking into
account those with whom they are talking.
Thus deconstructionists view oral testimonies as no different to other forms of
evidence. They are equally relational and fragmented, bound by assumptions,
embedded with intent, in need of interpretation and revealing of the limitations in
representations of historical reality (De Hart, 1993; Hamilton, 2002; White, 2000).
Rather than framing their thoughts around notions of truth as in “the most accurate
kind of information”, when people speak they construct stories “that carry the values
and meanings that most forcibly get their points across” (White, 2000, p. 30). In this
sense, oral evidence is “produced in contentious dialogue”, that is, in a process of
negotiation and renegotiation that renders absolute notions of truth and falsity
obsolete. Hence, rather than embracing reconstructionist advice to avoid leading
questions, deconstructionists propose “leading informants and arguing with them”
(White, 2000, p. 32). Only by conducting interviews in such a manner will the
historian learn what the informant believes is important enough to defend. The
reconstructionist drive to distinguish between true and false stories is, in many
instances, not only irrelevant but “eclipses all the intricate ways in which people use
social truths to talk about the past” (White, 2000, p. 42; Burton, 2003).
Visual Evidence: Film and Photographs
Table 5 compares the different epistemological assumptions that underpin film and
photographs as historical materials. Reconstructionism finds little of evidential
quality in film (box 1). Among reconstructionists, production, and especially the
unavoidable intrusion of the film-maker into the production process, relegates film
firmly into the realm of fiction: “pictures are worth a thousand words”, says Larry
Gerlach, “but not if you want to explain history” (cited in Pope, 1996, p. 77).
Reconstructionists acknowledge the power of film to connect viewers with events
and people (box 1). Ken Burns’s documentary Baseball, says Gerlach, “accomplished
what legions of baseball historians have failed to do — impart to millions an
appreciation for and understanding of baseball as the national pastime and the ways
in which sport is an integral part of American history” (cited in Pope, 1996, p. 77).
But ultimately reconstructionists find an incompatibility between the crafts of history
and film-making. Gerlach maintains that the “vast majority of the visual
inaccuracies” in Burns’s Baseball are deliberate, the manifestations of poetic or artistic
license (cited in Pope, 1996, p. 73).
Deconstructionists, by contrast, essentially see film, like history, as a genre of
fiction (box 3). Deconstructionists are less concerned with factual veracity than with
the lessons films teach. Dan Nathan (2000) captures the deconstructionist position in
his comments on The Hurricane, a story of boxer Rubin Carter’s 19-year wrongful
imprisonment for a triple homicide. While noting the ‘manipulative qualities’ of the
film, Nathan nonetheless concludes that it conveys important lessons about racism in
America.
Here, however, my focus is on the way constructionists employ theory as the
link between evidence and reality. This is represented in box 2 and further illustrated
in an analysis of a surf video, Runman 69.7 Released in 1989, Runman 69 primarily
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shows non-professional surfers riding dangerous conditions at less well-known surf
breaks in and around Los Angeles. Runman 69 is one in a series that constitutes a
genre of underground surf films. The images, signs and messages in this genre are
radically different from those conveyed by mainstream surf-industry videos.
Table 5. Epistemological Assumptions of Photographs and Films
Epistemological Assumptions
Historical
Material Reconstructionism Constructionism Deconstructionism
Films
• Documentary films
and historical practice
generally
incompatible
• Films: powerful
mediums for
transporting viewers
to events
1.
• Films: contextualised
within theory to reveal
reality
2.
• Documentary films
and historical practice
both fictional
creations
3.
Photos
• Photographs:
represent prima facie
evidence
• Reception resides in
non- theorised context
and circumstances of
the image which limit
alternative
interpretations
4.
• Photographs:
contextualised within
theory to reveal reality
• Reception resides in
theorised context and
circum-stances of the
image which limit
alternative interpreta-
tions
5.
• Photographs:
ambiguous texts
passed through many
mediating filters
• New
theories—semiology,
structuralism,
psycho-
analysis—assist
interpre-tation
• Different
interpretations are
normal
6.
Evidence of this difference emerges from comparative viewings with scores of surf
videos and press releases heralding the videos. One press release accompanying
Runmental promised a “below the radar assault on the unsuspecting…homogenized
globally cloned surf species” (Runman, 2003, para.1). We probably cannot “resurrect
the sold-out soul of surfing”, this particular press release continues, “but at the very
least we will fucking molten lava roast it”. Further evidence of Runman as a different
genre comes from the reaction of mainstream surf culture. Where magazines did
publish reviews, comments were typically brief and condemnatory. Surfer Magazine
said of Runman 69: “There’s enough mean, debauched and evil stuff in [the video] to
make [us] a little leery about giving it a good review” (Runman, no date, para. 3). The
Surfer’s Journal likened Runmental to “a clown at a rodeo, a bad joke at a wedding, or
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a loud fart at a funeral”:  “This is the Anti-surf flick”, the review concluded
(Runman, no date b, para. 3).
But if Runman 69 is part of a different genre, how, precisely, does it differ?
Cultural insiders will immediately recognise three key differences. Firstly, Runman
69 celebrates the counterculture soul-surfing riding style of the 1970s, a style
characterised by the appearance of effortlessness on the wave. Secondly, the video
scorns the new hyperkinetic style that accompanied the codification of professional
surfing in which riders try to fit as many manoeuvres as possible into a single wave.
The third difference emerges in the way the surfers in Runman 69 distribute prestige,
what William Goode (1978) calls a prime force in human society and what Alain de
Botton (2004, p. 3) labels “one of the finest earthly goods”.
Most explanations of how individuals earn prestige conceptualise the concept
within a rational, utilitarian framework where prestige is a reward that is
accumulated for the purposes of reproducing and conserving human life (Bataille,
1932). But as Georges Bataille (1932) reminds us, utilitarian frameworks conceal and
distort a fundamental reality. Prestige, he says, is often conferred not by acts of
accumulation but through “unproductive expenditures: luxury, mourning, war,
cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, [and]
perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality) – activities which…have
no end beyond themselves” (1932, p. 118). Bataille argues that rather than being part
of an economy of accumulation, prestige is actually part of an economy of loss where
the yardstick is not how much one accumulates, but how much one is prepared to
lose. The surfers in Runman 69 illustrate Bataille’s economy of loss in their
willingness to incur serious injury in their quest for prestige.
Arguably such forms of ‘expenditure’ operate in all sports. However,
mainstream sports manage this expenditure and co-opt it into schemes of utility. For
example, untempered excesses and pleasures – violence, gambling, abuse of women
– that are obvious in body-contact sports like football, boxing and ice-hockey are
typically concealed behind official rules, referees, elaborate scoring systems and, of
course, media and educational institutions that discursively recover social utility in
sport. The media and educational institutions simultaneously blast all excesses and
insist that sports teach leadership and discipline that participants carry over into
competitive, accumulation-based careers (e.g., Ryan, 2004). Far from playing this
game the producers of Runman 69 encourage followers to “take a crap in someone’s
pool” and “ask your boss if you can take his 13-year-old-daughter away for the
weekend” (Runman, 2003). In this context it is hardly surprising that the video
received poor reviews.
Thus constructionists, like reconstructionists, interpret films within the
prevailing cultural and political contexts, within the circumstances in which the film
was produced or commissioned, and within the context of its physical location.
However, constructionists also theorise different elements (e.g., the distribution of
prestige in Runman 69). Such theorising frames constructionist interpretations and
their views of reality; among constructionists, alternative interpretations derive from
misunderstandings, poor contextualisation or, most probably, inappropriate
theorisation (e.g., utilitarian concepts of prestige).
Deconstructionists, by contrast, argue that different interpretations are normal
(Burke, 2001). This latter point emerges in the following examination of photographs
as historical material. Yet, as we shall see, despite their embrace of different
interpretations, deconstructionists also tend to frame these differences within theory.
Boxes 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5 sum up the respective epistemological assumptions
of reconstructionist, constructionist and deconstructionist approaches to
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photographs as historical material. As per box 4, conservative reconstructionists hold
photographs as prima facie evidence. Reconstructionists argue that a photograph is ‘a
direct and true rendering of reality as it existed at the moment the camera shutter
operated’. Reconstructionists define photographs as “timeless document[s] that, after
minimum identification, need no further context, social background or ideological
framework to be understood and creatively redeployed” (Hayes, Silvester &
Hartmann, 2002, p. 118; Burke, 2001; Ritchie, 2003; Whimpress, 2003). Indeed in most
monographs, photographs appear as visual facts.
Ironically, the ease with which photographs translate visual interpretations of
cultural patterns, social behaviours and incidents into concrete facts means that they
actually require more careful corroboration and contextualisation (Hayes, Silvester &
Hartmann, 2002). Cheryl Cole (2000) offers an example with two photographs of
olympic 100 meters champion Ewa Klobukowska. The first, from Time magazine,
shows a masculine-looking Klobukowska crossing a finishing line. Publication of the
photograph coincided with news that Klobukowska had just failed a sex test at a
European Cup event in 1967 and Time “quite clearly” wanted to cast doubt on her
gender (Cole, 2000, p. 130). The second photograph appeared 20 years later in an
article by Alison Turnbull published in New Scientist. Turnbull painted Klobukowska
as a victim of sex testing; the photograph shows the athlete in a victory pose that
accentuates her femininity.
Corroboration and contextualisation are often implicitly, and occasionally
explicitly, theoretical. Cole’s analysis, for example, fits firmly within a feminist
framework and a theoretical perspective that views gender as socially constructed
(box 5).
As mentioned above and shown in box 6, deconstructionists are highly
sensitive to the ways that different individuals or groups view or receive the same
images. In this sense, deconstructionists see photographs as “ambiguous texts rather
than accurate records of ‘the truth’’ (Bale, 1998, pp. 235-236). Deconstructionists talk
about photographs passing through mediating filters. These filters include the
subjectivity of the photographer, protocols accompanying occasions at which
photographs are shot, how different subjects present themselves to cameras,
variations in the technical means of producing prints, the public or private circuits
into which photographs are inserted, and the ultimate fates of photographs – framed
family portrait, book illustration, file in an archive (box 6) (Hayes, Silvester &
Hartmann, 2002).
John Bale (1998) highlights this aspect of deconstructionism in his brilliant
analysis of photographic depictions of high jumping among Rwandan Tutsi in the
early twentieth century. Among the photographs that Bale deconstructed is one
showing the Duke of Mecklenburg and his adjunct standing between two high jump
uprights with a Tutsi jumper passing over their heads to clear, according to the
Duke, a height of 2.50 metres. The “preferred meaning” of the photographer, says
Bale, is unknown and the actual image can be read in a number of ways: as “a means
of authenticating the expedition” (i.e., to demonstrate to the reader that the writer
was actually there), as a “personal memento of the African visit”, or as a record of
Tutsi achievement in a western sport.
Bale reads the photograph to connote European power. At first glance Bale’s
interpretation seems skewed: the Tutsi jumper – the apparent subject – sails
smoothly over the heads of the “overdressed Duke…and his militarily uniformed
adjunct”, and the low position of the camera outlines the athlete “against the sky”
thus “heightening the dramatic effects of the jump”. Yet, as Bale observes, the high
jumper does not assume an unequivocal “visual primacy’ over the two Germans. On
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the contrary, “the Europeans command the center even if they are not the subject of
the photograph” and their centrality combined with “upright posture and military
uniform” symbolise “power and control – the condition of European hegemony over
Africa” (Bale, 1998, pp. 237-244).
Bale’s deconstruction is a perfect example of an innovative and creative use of
historical material. While the Mecklenburg photograph yields scant evidence of Tutsi
high jumping per se, it offers precious testimony into a cultural encounter between
colonisers and colonised. Of course, such ingenuity requires that historians learn
more advanced techniques for reading images than the commonsensical methods of
interrogation and corroboration advocated by reconstructionists. Many of these
techniques immerse historians in theory – in Bale’s case semiology, structuralism
and psychoanalysis (e.g., box 6).
While theory is the staple of constructionism it is also integral to
deconstructionist interpretation. Herein lies a key point of this article. While
deconstructionists stress that the producers can neither fix the meanings of their
materials that may become historical fragments nor determine their reception among
subsequent generations, this does not mean that any interpretation is as good as
another. Theory separates strong interpretation from weak interpretation in
deconstructionism.
CONCLUSION
History is increasingly moving away from the craft of recovering facts towards the
practice of interpreting remnants from the past. As this article has demonstrated, the
act of interpretation demands careful reasoning that incorporates sophisticated
contextualisation and theorisation. Notwithstanding the problems associated with
defining and operationalising contextualisation (e.g., Berkhofer, 1995; Walsh, 1974;
White, 1973), it has clearly been integral to interpreting each of the historical
fragments examined in this article. No interpretation of the protocol books listing the
times and dosages of androgenic-anabolic steroids administered to East German
athletes would be complete without the context of that state’s place in twentieth
century Europe and the deep wounds of the Second World War; no interpretation of
Jack O’Neil’s testimony would be complete without the context of racial segregation
in America; no interpretation of Runman 69 would be complete without the context
of the anti-competition, utopian counterculture of the late 1960s and early 1970s; and
no interpretation of the photograph depicting the Tutsi jumping over the Duke of
Mecklenburg would be complete without the context of colonialism. And,
notwithstanding the problems associated with defining and operationalising theory
(e.g., Denzin, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1978), no interpretation of Runman 69 or the
Mecklenburg photograph would be complete without a theory of prestige and
semiology respectively.
Reflecting on the interpretation of historical materials also reveals a
fundamental shift in the objectives of history away from the recovery of the past for
the past’s sake to an approach in which historical practitioners are much more
attuned to the complex relationships between the present and the past. Once the
dominant approach, the recovery of facts to write seamless descriptive narratives
such as The Sporting Scots of Nineteenth-Century Canada (Redmond, 1982) or Aussie
Gold: The Story of Australia at the Olympics (Howell & Howell, 1988) is rapidly
receding into the background. In its place are histories that are less concerned with
facts and details and more interested in the ways that people and events are
“represented and remembered” and what those representations and memories “say
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about [sporting] culture and the process of making meaning” (Nathan, 2003, p. 220;
see also Bale & Cronin, 2003; Bloom, 2000; McGimpsey, 2000; Oriard, 1995, 2001;
Phillips, 2004). Not only are these issues typically more substantial but they also
reinforce the present-centred nature of history, that is, rather than fixing the past as
absolute, historians continually re-examine the past in response to contemporary
issues and concerns. Herein lies the real relevance of history as a means of
understanding how people make sense of themselves and their worlds.
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NOTES
1. These categories do not encapsulate the sum total of historical sources; they simply represent
a sample of the more common types of materials upon which sport historians draw. The
categories derive from Marwick (1981, 2001). Moreover, historians rarely rely on just one
type of material for evidence which, rather than answering or clarifying historical questions,
typically raises fresh issues. In other words, historians generally believe that the vaster the
array of primary material, the more dependable the historical knowledge (White, 2000;
Malcolmson, 1973).
2. The status of the archive in contemporary history is the subject of intense debate. Critics
argue that in their original constructions they excluded the voices of subordinate groups and
classes. Even today primary sources housed within recognised repositories will draw less
attention than those outside (Burton, 2003).
3. A promising teenage athlete in East Germany, Berendonk defected to West Germany in 1958.
She represented West Germany at the 1972 olympics and later married Franke, a molecular-
biologist. In 2000, German courts convicted Höppner and Manfred Ewald (discussed later)
of intentionally harming athletes.
4. As well as being sites of excision, archives are also sites of excess in the sense that they can
allow for unlimited and imaginative readings (Nuttall, 2002).
5. Jacques Derrida (1996) has been particularly influential in shaping historical analysis of the
archive. Harris (2002a, p. 65) provides a useful summary of Derrida’s principal assertions:
“1) the event, the origin, the arkhé, in its uniqueness, is irrecoverable, unfindable. The
possibility of the archiving trace, this simple possibility, can only divide the uniqueness; 2)
The archiving trace, the archive, is not simply a recording, a reflection, an image of the event.
It shapes the event. “The archivization produces as much as it records the event”; 3) The
object does not speak for itself. In interrogating and interpreting the object, the archive,
scholars inscribe their own interpretation into it. The interpretation has no meta-textual
authority. There is no meta-archive. There is no closing of the archive. “It opens out of the
future”; 4) Scholars are not, can never be, exterior to their objects. They are marked before
they interrogate the markings, and this pre-impression shapes their interrogation”.
Interestingly, Derrida (1996) provides little actual analysis of the archive as a repository of
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information; his work is more about psychoanalysis and the political and social misuses of
power (Steedman, 2001).
6. See Ward and Burns (1994) for a transcript of the interview.
7. This section draws on Booth and Fisher (2004) and Fisher (2004).

